

**An Analysis of the Efficiency of Bank Mergers in Korea**

**2001 2**

## Abstract

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# **An Analysis of the Efficiency of Bank Mergers in Korea**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Economic crisis touched off by plight in foreign currency that resulted from the bankruptcy of Hanbo, one of Korea's 10 business conglomerates, in 1997 as well as an agreement to postpone the insolvency of KIA Motors created a cloud in the mind of foreign investors on the situation of the Korean financial industry. At that time, 5 banks among 33 local banks were closed down and an additional 5 banks merged or disappeared from the scene. After this radical reform, a new financial environment was created. Due to the advent of new local financial institutions, competition among them grew more fierce and profitability declined. Further opening of the financial market along with accession to the OECD made competition with foreign financial institutions inevitable.

Although M&As of financial institutions is not the best answer, market pressure deemed mergers as a necessary strategy for survival. In this connection, future bank M&As should be voluntary to enhance competitiveness, in contrast to government-led M&As under public

finance support.

Under the drastically changing internal and external environment, it is imperative for Korean financial institutions to improve their competitive edge for survival. Until recently, analyses of the effectiveness of our banking industry have been mainly focused on measuring economies of scale and scope. The ultimate purpose of bank mergers is to enlarge the scale and diversify operations to increase profitability and secure variety of income sources so as to realize effective input and utilization of business resources, expand market domination, improve business operation and boost the dynamic value of industry.

The purpose of this study is to find out the most effective type of merger through an econometric and empirical analysis and simulation of M&A. Utilizing data on 15 Korean banks from 1995 to 1999, we estimate the cost function to test and mutually compare the economies of scale and scope of the local banking industry. Major findings of this thesis are as follows:

- 1) Using Translog cost function, the economies of scale and scope for 15 general local banks were measured, but the result does not show evidence of economies of scale and scope.
  
- 2) Results of the empirical analysis revealed that M&A of Korean banks would produce approximately a 3% cost increase. Also, our results showed that about 64% among 105 possible combinations exhibit post-merger cost increase. Under the current circumstances, inter-bank mergers are fraught with considerable risk. The results of the test clearly disclosed that a merger among small scale banks



brings about a negative outcome. This is a case where loss is evident. In terms of risk of cost increase, a merger among big banks showed the lowest likely level of risk on average with respect to any combination of mergers. But in this case it should be remembered that the cause of cost decrease is also the lowest. On the other hand, M&A between middle-scale and small-scale banks would likely entail a considerably low cost decrease despite a substantial likelihood of increased burden cost-wise. Thus, it is revealed that a merger among banks, regardless of its form, clearly shows a relationship in its advantages and disadvantages.

From 1995 to 1999, Korea's macroeconomic condition was unlike any prior period of economic growth. In particular, considerable change in banks' cost structure was inherent for their insolvent credit and restructuring. Thus, a conclusion can be drawn that no synergy effect of cost can be realized merely through mergers in general. Increase in efficiency by generating a synergy effect from economies of scale and scope is what is expected from the merger of financial institutions. But we should remind ourselves that unconditional mergers are not a cure-all and may entail inefficiency too.

The success or failure of mergers of Korean banks are affected by the goals and strategy of the particular merger and various other factors such as the external environment. For this reason, prior to merging, a thorough plan should be established and feasible examination be made. The appropriate subject for merger should then be chosen and it to be implemented concurrently it is imperative to seek measures for maximizing the effect of a merger at this stage.

The limitations of this study are as follows:

First, due to limitations on the analysis of Translog method effect from regulation on banks and technical changes being considered as having major impact upon production, technical relationship of bank was not subjected to analysis.

Second, main stress was placed upon analysis of cost structure merely for this reason and as a result of the above-mentioned mock test did not give explanation on what kind of effect is produced upon profit structure.

Third, by using data on period containing duration of workout of banks for analysis of cost, there is no continuity and symmetry in terms of time sequence of data.

For the purpose of overcoming the above mentioned limitation of this study, which attempted to analyze the efficiency of bank mergers, a more systematic and empirical examination is required. In the future, the following research would be required:

First, instead of Translog cost function form containing local flexibility there is a need for analysis by means of nonparametric statistics with more flexibility across the whole sector.

Second, Translog cost function is only capable of finding out the cost aspect. Accordingly, a study by means of profit function approach, which takes account of the income aspect too, should be attempted.

Third, there is also need for a additional study on mergers among financial institutions of different kinds to form a leading international combined financial group and on the effect of such mergers on the financial industry.

1

1

1997 10

33 가 5

5

30% (10 ), 19.6%, 34.8% 가

가

(Brand Power)

OECD 가

가

M&A

(simulation)

2

가

가

M&A

1990

M&A가

가

M&A

M&A가

1980

1990

가

M&A가 가

가

M&A

가 가 가 가  
가 가 . 가 .  
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가 가

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가 가

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1995

1999

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1) (1996), p.4.

가 가 .

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1)

Kolari and Zardkoohi(1987), Shaffer(1988), Evanoff and Israilevich (1990),  
Noulas et.al.(1990)

Lawerence(1989) Mester(1990), Longbrake and Haslem(1975)

Noulas et. al.(1990)<sup>4)</sup> Hunter and  
Timme(1995)<sup>5)</sup>

$$\ln TC = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \cdot Q_i + \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i \cdot \ln P_i + \frac{1}{2} [ \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} Q_i Q_j + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \gamma_{ij} \ln P_i \ln P_j ] + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \eta_{ij} \ln P_i Q_j ] + \epsilon \quad \dots \dots \dots (2- 1)$$

---

3) (1988), p. 354.  
4) Noulas, Ray and Miller(1990), pp. 94- 108.  
5) Hunter and Timme (1995), pp. 165- 185.

$$TC = \dots, \quad (\dots)$$

$$Q_{i=1} = \dots$$

$$Q_{i=2} = \dots \text{가}$$

$$Q_{i=3} = \dots$$

$$P_{i=1} = \dots 1$$

$$P_{i=2} = \dots$$

$$=$$

, , ,

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 \beta_i = 1; \quad \sum_{i=1}^2 \gamma_{ij} = 0; \quad \sum_{i=1}^2 \delta_{ij} = 0 \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-2)$$

$$\delta_{ij} = \delta_{ji}; \quad \gamma_{ij} = \gamma_{ji} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-3)$$

$$S_i = -\frac{\ln TC}{\ln P_i} = -\frac{TC}{P_i} \frac{P_i}{TC} = \frac{P_i X_i}{TC}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq n \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-4)$$

$$S_i = \dots P_i, \dots$$

$$S_i = \beta_i + \sum_{j=1}^2 \gamma_{ij} \ln P_j + \sum_{j=1}^3 \delta_{ij} Q_j + \varepsilon \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-5)$$

$$SE = \sum_{i=1}^3 \frac{\ln TC}{Q_i} = \sum_{i=1}^3 \alpha_i + \sum_{i=1}^3 \sum_{j=1}^3 \delta_{ij} Q_j + \sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^3 \beta_{ij} \ln P_i$$

$$SE < 1, \quad \text{가,}$$

SE=1 , , 가  
SE>1 ,

2)

Gilligan Smirlock and Marshall  
(1984), Gilligan and Smirlock(1984), Kim(1985), Kolari and Zardkoohi(1987),  
Benston, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey(1983), Murray and White(1983),  
Kim(1986), LeCompte and Smith(1987), Mester(1987), Lawrence and  
Shay(1986), Lawrence(1989) 가

高橋豊治(1986), Berger and Humphrey(1992)

. Mester(1996)

. Berger and Humphrey(1992)

가

가 . Clark(1986)

1973 1982 300

가 ,

(economic of scope)

2

(2-6) (2-10) .

$$Sco_n = \frac{[C(y_1, 0, \dots, 0) + C(0, y_2, 0, \dots, 0) + \dots + C(0, 0, \dots, y_n) - C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)]}{C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)} \dots \dots \dots (2-6)$$

$C(y_i, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$   $y_i$  .

$$Sco_n = \frac{[C(y_1, y_2^m, \dots, y_n^m) + C(y_1^m, y_2, y_3^m, \dots, y_n^m) + \dots + C(y_1^m, y_2^m, \dots, y_n^m) - C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)]}{C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)} \dots \dots \dots (2-7)$$

$y_1 \dots y_i$  ,  $Sco_n > 0$  , 가

$$Sco_n = \frac{[C(y_1, 0, \dots, 0) + C(0, y_2, \dots, y_n) - C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)]}{C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)} \dots \dots \dots (2-8)$$

0  $y_i$   $y_i^m = 0$  가 가  
 가 가  
 가 .

$$Sco_1 = \frac{[C(y_1, y_2^m, \dots, y_n^m) + C(y_1^m, y_2, \dots, y_n) - C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)]}{C(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)} \dots \dots \dots (2-9)$$

가  $i$  가  $j$   
 $i$   $j$   
 (2-10) .

$$\frac{\partial^2 C}{\partial y_i \partial y_j} = \left\{ \left( -\frac{\partial^2 \ln TC}{\partial \ln y_i \partial \ln y_j} \right) + \left( -\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln Y_i} \right) \left( -\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln y_j} \right) \right\} \dots \dots \dots (2-10)$$

$$i \neq j \quad \frac{\partial^2 C}{\partial y_i \partial y_j} < 0$$

3)

X-

(Econometric Frontier Approach: EFA)<sup>6)</sup>,

(Thick Frontier Approach: TFA)<sup>7)</sup>, Distribution-Free Approach:(DFA),

Data Envelope Analysis:(DEA)<sup>8)</sup>, Translog

9)

Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes(1978)

가

X

/

6)

가

7)

4

quartile  
quartile

8)

가

가

9) Berger and Humphrey(1992), pp. 245 279.

(asset approach),

(user cost approach)

가가

(value-added approach) 가

$Y_R$

$Y_r$

$$0 \leq \frac{(Y_r/X)}{(Y_R/X)} = \frac{Y_r}{Y_R} \leq 1 \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-11)$$

$$: \quad \max \quad h_o = \frac{u Y_o}{V X_o} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-12)$$

$$: \quad \frac{u Y_R}{V X_R} \leq 1, \quad \frac{u Y_r}{V X_r} \leq 1, \quad u, V$$

$X_r, Y_r$

$Y_o = Y_r, X_o = X_r$

$$X_R = X_r = X, \quad Y_R \geq Y_r, \quad V^*, u^*$$

$$(2-12) \quad 1$$

$$(2-13) \quad .$$

$$h_o^* = \frac{u^* Y_o}{u^* Y_R} = \frac{Y_r}{Y_R} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-13)$$

(2-12)

(2-13)


(optimization model)

Charnes, Cooper, and

Rhodes (1978) CCR



2-1>



2-1	S, R, E, F, P	5	(Decision
Making Unit : DMU)	가	$X_1, X_2$	가
2	S, R, E, F	DMU	
P		Q	
Q		P	
O	P	OQP	

10) Farrel(1957), pp. 253 257.

OQ/OP ( )  
 P Q 가  
 가 .  
 k/k 가 ( -price efficiency)  
 (allocative efficiency) Q R  
 가 . k  
 k (cost line) 가 P<sub>1</sub> P<sub>2</sub> Q  
 R (가 ) Q  
 R 가  
 가  
 R R  
 OR/OQ

P DMU<sub>o</sub> . 2가  
 (X<sub>1</sub>, X<sub>2</sub>) 2 1가 (Y) .

$$\max h_o = \frac{2u}{3v_1 + 4v_2} \dots \dots \dots (2-14)$$

$$\frac{2u}{3v_1 + 4v_2} \leq 1, \quad \frac{2u}{2v_1 + 5v_2} \leq 1, \quad \frac{2u}{2.5v_1 + 2.5v_2} \leq 1$$

$$\frac{2u}{4v_1 + 2v_2} \leq 1, \quad \frac{2u}{5v_1 + 2v_2} \leq 1$$

$$u^* = 0.5, \quad v_1^* = 1/3, \quad v_2^* = 1/15$$

가 P  $h_o^* = \frac{2u^*}{3v_1^* + 4v_2^*} = 15/19 = 0.79$  .

t .

$$\begin{aligned} \mu &= tu \\ &= tv \\ \sum v X_o &= \sum v X_o = 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\max \sum_{r=1}^s \mu_r Y_{r0} \dots \dots \dots (2-15)$$

$$\sum_{r=1}^s \mu_r Y_{rj} - \sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{ij} \leq 0, \quad \sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{i0} = 1,$$

$$- \mu_r \leq -\epsilon, \quad -v_i \leq -\epsilon$$

$$r = 1, 2, \dots, s$$

$$i = 1, 2, \dots, m$$

>0 Non-Archimedean

(2-15) 가 (dual theorem)

$$\min h_o = \theta - \epsilon \left( \sum_{i=1}^m s_i^- + \sum_{r=1}^s s_r^+ \right) \dots \dots \dots (2-16)$$

$$\theta X_{i0} - s_i^- - \sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij} = 0; \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m$$

$$-s_i^+ + \sum_{j=1}^n Y_{rj} = Y_{r0}; \quad r = 1, 2, \dots, s$$

$$s_i^-, s_r^+, \quad j \geq 0$$

가 ,

(2-15) (2-16) 가

$$h_o^* = \theta^* - \varepsilon \left( \sum_{i=1}^m s_i^- + \sum_{r=1}^s s_r^+ \right) = \sum_{r=1}^s \mu_r^* Y_{rj} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-17)$$

$$0 \leq h_o^* \leq 1, \quad h_o^* = 1$$

(1)  $\theta^* = 1$

(2) slack = 0 .

$$h_o^* = 1 \quad (2-15) \quad \sum_{r=1}^s \mu_r^* Y_{ro} = \sum_{i=1}^m v_i^* X_{io} = 1$$

$$\dots \dots \dots (2-16) \quad DMU_o$$

$$\theta X_{io} - s_i^- = \sum_{j=1}^m X_{ij} v_j^* ; \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-18)$$

$$Y_{ro} + s_r^+ = \sum_{j=1}^s Y_{rj} v_j^* ; \quad r = 1, 2, \dots, s$$

$$, \quad s_i^-, s_r^+, \quad j \geq 0$$

(  $\hat{X}_{io}, \hat{Y}_{ro}$  )

$$\hat{X}_{io} = X_{io} - s_i^- ; \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-19)$$

$$\hat{Y}_{ro} = Y_{ro} + s_r^+ ; \quad r = 1, 2, \dots, s$$

$$i \quad r \quad \hat{X}_{io} \leq \hat{Y}_{io}, \quad \hat{X}_{ro} \leq \hat{Y}_{ro} \quad (X_{io}, Y_{ro})$$

(efficiency surface)

$$\hat{X}_{io} = \sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij} \lambda_j^*, \quad \hat{Y}_{ro} = \sum_{j=1}^n Y_{rj} \lambda_j^* \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-20)$$

가 (2-16)  $\min \hat{\theta} = \theta^* = 1 \quad s_i^* = s_j^* = 0$

CCR-Projection

CCR (fractional programming) 11)

2-1 P

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & 2\mu \\ & 2\mu - 3v_1 - 4v_2 \leq 0, \quad 2\mu - 2v_1 - 5v_2 \leq 0 \\ & 2\mu - 2.5v_1 - 2.5v_2 \leq 0, \quad 2\mu - 4v_1 - 2v_2 \leq 0 \\ & 2\mu - 5v_1 - 2v_2 \leq 0, \quad 3v_1 + 4v_2 \leq 1 \end{aligned}$$

---

11) Charnes and Cooper (1962), pp.181-186.



가

(stochastic production frontier model)<sup>13)</sup>

$$y_{it} = h^*(x_{it}, \beta) - \mu_{it} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-21)$$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{it} + \dots + \beta_k x_{it}^k - \mu_{it}$$

( $i=1, 2, \dots, N$   $t=1, 2, \dots, T$ )

(2-21)  $h^*$   $\mu_{it}$  (white noise) 가 가  $\mu_{it} = 0$

가

OLS (unbiasedness) (efficiency)

---

13) (frontier production function) 가 (deterministic) (stochastic) (deterministic frontier production function) (stochastic frontier production function)  $y_{it} = f(x_{it}, \beta) - \mu_{it} (>0)$  (randomness)  $f(x_{it}, \beta)$   $y_{it}$   $\mu_{it}$  (specification) (one-sided distribution) (white noise) 가

(individual effect)<sup>14)</sup> (time effect)

(2-21)

가

가

$\mu_{it}$

가

(fixed effect model)

(fixed effect model)

(random effect model)

.15)

①

$\mu_{it}$

(2-22)

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{it} + \mu_{it} - \mu_i \dots \dots \dots (2-22)$$

14)

가 가

15)

가 가

Hausman(1978)

$$W = \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{b})^2}{\text{Var}(\hat{b}) - \text{Var}(\hat{b})}$$

$W > \chi^2(k)$

가



$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 - \beta_1 X_{it}$$

(2-22) (2-23) LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variable)

16)

(2-24)

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \beta_3 X_{i3} + \dots + \beta_k X_{ik} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2-23)$$

$y_i$	$\beta_0$	$\beta_1$	$\beta_2$	$\beta_3$	$\dots$	$\beta_k$	$\mu_i$	$\epsilon_{it}$
$y_1$	$1$	$0$	$0$	$0$	$\dots$	$0$	$1$	$X_{11}$
$y_2$	$0$	$1$	$0$	$0$	$\dots$	$0$	$2$	$X_{21}$
$y_3$	$0$	$0$	$1$	$0$	$\dots$	$0$	$3$	$X_{31}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
$y_n$	$0$	$0$	$0$	$\dots$	$1$	$0$	$n$	$X_{n1}$

$$y = D + X + \mu + \epsilon \quad (2-24)$$

$(NT \times 1)$      $(NT \times NT)$      $(NT \times 1)$      $(NT \times k)$      $(k \times 1)$      $(NT \times 1)$

OLS (partitioned regression)<sup>17)</sup>,

(2-25), (2-26) .<sup>18)</sup>

16) LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variable)  
 Greene(1993b), pp. 466-469 .  
 17) Greene(1993b), pp. 179-181 .  
 18) LSDV  
 가  
 가



(2-22)

(2-28)

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it}^2 + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it} - (\mu_i - E[\mu_i])$$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it}^2 + r_i + \epsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (2-28)$$

$$\beta_0 = \beta_0 - E[\mu_i], \quad r_i = \mu_i - E[\mu_i]$$

2 (two-step generalized least squares method)

$$\text{var}(\epsilon_{it}) = \text{var}(r_i)$$

, FGLS(Feasible Generalized Least Squares)

\*

(2-28)

(2-29) 가

$$E[\epsilon_{it}] = E[r_i] = 0, \quad E[\epsilon_{it}^2] = \sigma^2$$

$$E[r_i^2] = \sigma_r^2, \quad E[\epsilon_{it} r_j] = 0 \text{ for all } i, t, \text{ and } j$$

$$E[\epsilon_{it} \epsilon_{js}] = 0 \text{ if } t \neq s \text{ or } i \neq j$$

$$E[r_i r_j] = 0 \text{ if } i \neq j \dots \dots \dots (2-29)$$

$$w_{it} = \epsilon_{it} + r_i \quad w_i = [w_{i1}, w_{i2}, \dots, w_{it}]'$$

(2-29) 가  $E[w_{it}^2] = \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2, \quad E[w_{i1}, w_{is}] = 0$

$$\Omega = E[w_i, w_i] \quad (2-30)$$

,  $i, j$ 가 (covariance)

(2-31)

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2 \quad \sigma_r^2 \quad \dots \quad \sigma_r^2 \\
& \sigma_r^2 \quad \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2 \quad \dots \quad \sigma_r^2 \\
& \sigma_r^2 \quad \sigma_r^2 \quad \dots \quad \sigma_r^2 \\
= & \begin{pmatrix} \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ & & & \cdot \\ & & & \cdot \\ \sigma_r^2 & \sigma_r^2 & \dots & \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2 \end{pmatrix} \dots \dots \dots (2-30) \\
& \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\
& \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\
& \sigma_r^2 & \sigma_r^2 & \dots & \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2
\end{aligned}$$

$$= \sigma^2 I + \sigma_r^2 \mathbf{ii}'$$

$\mathbf{i} = 1$  (T x 1) (column vector)

$$\mathbf{V} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \end{pmatrix} = I \otimes \mathbf{x} \dots \dots \dots (2-31)$$

GLS (2-32)  $V^{-1/2} = I \otimes \Omega^{-1/2}, \quad \Omega^{-1/2}$

$$V^{-1/2} = I - \frac{\theta}{T} \mathbf{ii}' \dots \dots \dots (2-32)$$

$$\theta = 1 - \frac{\sigma_v}{(T\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_r^2)^{1/2}}$$

(2-32) - 1/2

GLS

20) i

$r_i$  (best linear unbiased predictor)  $r_i^*$

(2-33), (2-34) .

$$\hat{r}_i = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_t (y_{it} - \mu_i - b' X_{it}) = r_i = \hat{\mu}_i - E[\hat{\mu}_i] \dots (2-33)$$

$T_i$  i

$$r_i = \frac{-T_i \sum_t e_{it}}{T_i + \frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma_r^2}} = \left( \frac{\dots}{\dots} \right) e_{it} \dots (2-34)$$

$$\hat{e}_i = \hat{r}_i = \left( \frac{1}{T_i} \right) \sum_t e_{it}, \quad \sigma_v^2 = \frac{\sigma_r^2}{\dots}$$

20) - 1/2

$$y_{i1} - y_i$$

$$y_{i2} - y_i$$

$$y_i = \dots$$

$$y_{iT} - y_i$$

(2-33)  $\mu_i$   $E[\mu_i]$   
 normal distribution)  $\mu_i$  (half  
 normal distribution)  $\mu_{it}$  (symmetric

$$E[\mu_i] = 2\sigma / \sqrt{\pi} = 0.79788\sigma, \text{ var}[\mu_i] = \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - 1\right)\sigma^2$$

$\mu_i$   
 가 가 Cornwell, Schmidt, and  
 Sickles (1990) 가

$$(2-35) \quad 2$$

$$(2-36) \quad \hat{e}_{it} \quad \mu_{it}$$

$$\mu_{it} = \dots \dots \dots (2-35)$$

$$\hat{\mu}_{it} = \max_i(e_{it}) - e_{it}$$

$$\hat{\mu}_{it} = e_{it} - \min_i(e_{it}) \dots \dots \dots (2-36)$$

(2) (Thick Frontier Approach)

(EFA)

Berger and Humphrey (1992)

TFA

(thick frontier)

가 25% , 25%

가 25% , 25%

가 25%

TFA 25% 25%

가 25% (Q<sup>1</sup>)

25% (Q<sup>4</sup>)

25% AC<sup>Q<sup>1</sup></sup>, 25% AC<sup>Q<sup>4</sup></sup>

25% (predicted unit

cost) 가

(2-37)

$$\text{Diff} = [ \widehat{AC}^{Q^4} - \widehat{AC}^{Q^1} ] \widehat{AC}^{Q^1} \dots \dots \dots (2-37)$$

$$\widehat{AC}^{Q^i} \equiv \widehat{C}^{Q^i}(X^{Q^i}) / X^{Q^i}, \quad \widehat{AC}^{Q^1}:$$

$$\widehat{C}^{Q^i}(X^{Q^i}); \quad X^{Q^i}$$

$$X^{Q^i}:$$

(exogenous market factors)

(2-38)

$$\text{Market} = [\widehat{AC}^{Q^4} - \widehat{AC}^{Q^i}] / \widehat{AC}^{Q^1} \dots \dots \dots (2-38)$$

(2-38)       $\widehat{AC}^{Q^4}$      $\widehat{C}^{Q^i}$      $Q^4$      $X$       가      25%

가

25%

21)      (2-37)      (2-38)

(2-39)

$$\text{Ineff} = [\widehat{AC}^{Q^4} - \widehat{AC}^{Q^4}] / \widehat{AC}^{Q^1} = \text{Diff} - \text{Market} \dots \dots (2-39)$$

TEA      가      .

가      25%

25%

---

21) Berger and Humphrey (1992)



, 25%  
(thick-tailed distribution) 가 ,  
(thin-tailed distribution) 가

(bias) .

**(3) Distribution Free Approach**

(EFA)  
 $\mu_{it}$  가 Berger(1993)가 DFA  
 $\mu_{it}$   
가 .  
(random  
fluctuation) 가  
가 (2-40)

$$\ln TC_{it} = \ln C_i(y_{it}, p_{it}) + \ln \mu_{it} + \ln \epsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (2-40)$$

$C_i(y_{it}, p_{it})$  y 가 p  
 $TC_{it}$  ,  $\mu_{it}$  ,  $\epsilon_{it}$  .

$$(2-40) \quad (\ln \mu_{it} + \ln \dots_{it})$$

$$\ln \dots_{it}$$

$$\ln \hat{\mu}_{it} \quad (2-41) \quad X- \quad 22) \quad .$$

$$INEFF_i = \exp (\min (\hat{\ln} \mu_i) - \hat{\ln} \dots_i) \quad \dots \quad (2-41)$$

$$\min (\hat{\ln} \mu_i) \quad \hat{\ln} \mu_i$$

**(4) DEA<sup>23)</sup>**

DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis)

(non-parametric approach)

가 (Decision Making Unit : DMU)

DEA

가 .

DEA Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes(1978)가 Farrell(1957)

( CCR ) .

(Multiplicative) 가

(Additive) . CCR

---

22) X-  
23) (1993) 1987 1991

(1994) 1991 1995

$$h_0 = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s u_r Y_{r0}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{i0}} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s u_r Y_{rj}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{ij}} \leq 1, \quad j=1, 2, \dots, n \quad (2-42)$$

$$\text{Max } h_0 = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s u_r Y_{r0}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{i0}} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-42)$$

$$\frac{\sum_{r=1}^s u_r Y_{rj}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{ij}} \leq 1, \quad \frac{u_r}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{ij}} \leq \dots, \quad \frac{v_i}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_i X_{ij}} \leq \dots$$

(2-42)  $X_{ij}, i=1, 2, \dots, m, j=1, 2, \dots, n, Y_{rj}, r=1, 2, \dots, s, u_r, v_i$  가  
 (2-42)  $0$

(2-42)가

(2-42)  $DMU_0$

(22-43) <sup>24)</sup>

$$h_0^* = \sum_{r=1}^s \mu_r^* Y_{rj} \quad \dots \dots \dots (2-43)$$

$$\mu = t u, t$$

24) (2-42)

(1993), pp. 42-46

가 가  
 가  
 DMU가  
 ,25)

(5) Translog

(Translog)

.26) (2-44)

$$\ln y = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \ln x_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_{ij} \ln x_i \ln x_j \dots \dots \dots (2-44)$$

$\alpha_{ij} = \alpha_{ji}$ ,  $\alpha_i$  :

(duality) (2-45)

25) Berger and Humphrey (1992), pp.120-121.

26) Diewert (1982, p. 554)

(regularity condition)

가 ① C C(y, p) 非陰 ② C  
 . ③ C . ④ 正  
 (strictly positive) . ⑤ C p  
 Lau (1974) 2 가 가

$$\ln TC = \ln c_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \ln y_i + \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i \ln p_i + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^m \gamma_{ij} \ln y_i \ln y_j + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} \ln p_i \ln p_j \right] \quad (2-45)$$

TC : ,  $y_i$  : ,  $p_i$  : 가

(2-45)가 (2-46) 가

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i &= 1 \\ \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_{ij} &= 0, \quad 1 \leq j \leq n \\ \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{ij} &= 0, \quad 1 \leq j \leq m \end{aligned} \quad (2-46)$$

가 (m+1) , n ,  
 $\alpha_{ij} = \alpha_{ji} \{m(m+1)/2\}$  ,  $\beta_{ij} = \beta_{ji} \{n(n+1)/2\}$  ,  $\gamma_{ij}$   
 $\delta_{ij} = 0$  .  
 가 (27)

## 2

### 1. P&A

27) 0

1 .

P&A(Purchase and Assumption)

.28) P&A . P&A  
( ) (repurchase agreemen  
t)<sup>29)</sup> .  
P&A  
30)  
30 , 60 90 .  
(receiver) ,  
, , (tax  
receivables)  
P&A ( )  
가

---

28) (1998), p.30.

29) 'repo' 'pps' 가

30) 가 , , ,

1) P&A

P&A

가

P&A

가

FDIC(

)가

가

가

FDIC가

2) P&A

1980

가

FDIC

P&A

3) P&A

P&A

가

가

31)

P&A

10%가

---

31)

FDIC

가

4) P&A

P&A , 가 ,  
20% 50%가  
P&A  
,

2. M&A

(M&A: Mergers and Acquisitions)

1970 가 .32)

① ② ③  
가 가  
M&A  
1980 가  
, 1990  
가  
가

32) (1997), p. 36.



< 2-1 >

가		
	*80 * * 가 *	* * * *
	*EU * * *	* 가 , * * *
	* * , * , 가	* *

: , 『 』 , 1998. p. 39.

1) M&A

1980

· , 1980 ,

가

Countries: LDC) , (Less Developed  
LBO), (Land) “ 3L ” (Leveraged Buyout:

(1999.1)

1991 M&A

1996

. 1990  
가

2010 40% ( )

.33)

< 2-2>

+

1993 95

Chase Manhattan M&A

가

(<

2-3> ).

33)

(1999), pp. 532 534.

< 2-2>

		(10 )
Nations Bank+Barnett Bank	97. 8. 29.	15.52
Wells Fargo+ First Interstate	96. 1. 24.	12.31
Chemical+Chase Manhattan	95. 8. 25.	11.36
Dean Witter Discover+Morgan Stanley	97. 2. 5.	10.72
Travelers+Salomon	97. 9. 24.	9.75

: *Asian Wall Street Journal*(1998. 4. 14)

< 2-3> 1993 95

( : )

Chase Manhattan	3,000 6,000
Fleet Financial	5,500
Chemical	4,350
Banc One	4,300
BankAmerica	3,750
First Interstate	3,053
Bankers Trust	1,400
U.S. Bancorp	1,400
J.P. Morgan	850

: *The Bankers*, .

2)

34). 1980

(globalization)

1990 , 가 가

OECD 가 1998

100%

가

가

M&A

M&A 가 가

- , -

가 CS -UBS

1989

10%

, 1999 11 12 「 - 」

(< 2-4 > ).

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34) (1996), (1997).

< 2-4>

1933	-	.
1956		.
1970		.
1994	- (Riegle-Neal Act)	. (州) - -
1989 97		. ( 10% 25%)
1999		. 가 . ,

: , 『 』 , 2000.

1 가 1997 6,920 1999 1.4 2  
가 가  
( < 2-5> ).

< 2-5> 3

10

( , 10 )

	1997	1998	1999 <sup>4)</sup>
1	( , 692)	( , 735)	<sup>1)</sup> ( , 1,381)
2	( , 580)	UBS ( , 687)	3 <sup>2)</sup> ( , 1,044)
3	( , 484)	( , 669)	<sup>3)</sup> ( , 1,002)
4	( , 474)	( , 618)	( , 840)
5	HSBC( , 471)	( , 580)	( , 721)
6	( , 433)	( , 541)	( , 717)
7	( , 428)	ABN ( , 507)	BNP ( , 702)
8	( , 420)	HSBC( , 483)	( , 633)
9	( , 414)	( , 475)	UBS ( , 615)
10	ABN ( , 413)	ING ( , 464)	HSBC( , 569)

: 1) (第一勧業)+ (富士)+ (日本興業)

2) (東海)+ + (三和)

3) + (住友)

4)

: , 『 , 2000.』

3)

EC

4)

가

2

가

1960

가

1960

가

1968 6 1 “

”

가

1990

(1992 6 )

가

3

가

가





. (1996) 가  
 , , 가  
 ,  
 . 가 300  
 182 9.9% , 118  
 10% 가 , X  
 .  
 X-  
 가  
 ,  
 가  
 .  
 . (1991) 1984 89 7 10  
 .  
 (proxy variable)  
 ,  
 .  
 가  
 가 , 가  
 .

가 ,

가 .

5 (dummy variables)

가 가 가 가

가 가

가 (embodied)

가

가

35)

(1992)

, (cost subadditivity), (competitive viability)

---

35) . (1991), pp.80-84.

가

( + ), 가 ( + ),

가

가 가 ,

가

(1993) 17

가

4.5% 가

가

17 가 136 16 17%

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36) (1992), pp.109 153.

가 , 5 15 6 9%

,

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(1993) (1993)

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(

) ,

가 .

3,000 가 ,

가 3,000 ,37)

, , 가

,

,38)

(1993) 17 1988 91

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, X

가 ,39)

(1993)

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(1994) 1987 92 17

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37) (1993), pp.113 144.  
 38) (1993), pp.157 190.  
 39) (1993), pp.20 42.

40)

가

Cobb-Douglas , DEA,

(multiproducts translog cost function)

가

1990

가

< 2-6 >

---

40) (1994), pp. 39 64.

< 2-6 >

(1991)	· · ·	· · 가 ·	· · 가 · · · · · · 가 ( + ) · 가 ( + ) · · ·	(  )	1984 89 17
(1992)	· · 가 ·	· 가 · · · · ( + ) · 가 ( + ) · · ·	· 가 · · · · · · · 가 ( + ) · 가 ( + ) ·		1985 90 18
(1993)	· · 가 ·	· ·	· ( + ) · ·	(4.5% ) 報酬不變	- 1985 92 17
(1993)	· ·	· ·	· 3,000 · 3,000	報酬不變	1987 89
(1993)	· · · 가		( ,84 87 )	-	- 1978 91 15
(1993)	· , , 가 · , , 가		· · ·		- 1988 91 17
(1994)	· · ·		· · ·		1987 92 17

2.

Baumol, Panzar and Willig(1982) 1980

,  
.  
.

(duality theorem)

, 가 .

Alhadeff(1954)

.  
.

.  
가

. “Alhadeff  
가 1954  
”

.41)

M&A

. 1970

1989

---

41) Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), pp.225.

M&A

美 (S&Ls : Savings & Loan Associations)

가 , 가

가

(banking firms) (banking industry)

가

1960

가

(Commercial Banks), (S&Ls), (Credit Unions)

logarithmic cost function) (transcendent


가 1980 , 1990 .42)

---

42) (1990), (1991) (1992)  
가



(multi-products services)





가

43)

Alhadeff(1954), Gilligan and Smirlock(1984), Kim(1986), English, Grosskopf, Hayes, and Yaisawarng(1993)

가

가

Gilligan and Smirlock(1984)

가 가

가

Benston, Berger and Humphrey(1983), Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey(1987)

가

가

---

43) Goldsmith (1981), pp.575-585.

(1992), pp.117-123

, Greenbaum(1967),

Clark(1986)

Lawrence and Shay(1986), Lawrence(1989)

1980

Benston et al.(1983), Murray and White(1983), Gilligan and Smirlock(1984),  
Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall(1984), Kim(1986), Lawrence and  
Shay(1986), Berger and Humphrey(1987), Lawrence(1989), Mester(1990)

가

가

(Cobb-Douglas) 가

(output elasticity of cost)

가

1980

가

(translog cost function)

Box-Cox

(composite output index)

, 1980

(multiproduct)

가

Benston, Berger, Hanweck & Humphrey [1983]	Translog	. . 가	< > .2500 : .2500 :	
Gilligan & Smirlock [1984]	"	. ( . ) . 가	< > .2500 : .2500 :	
Gilligan, Smirlock & Marshall [1984]		. . 가	< > .2500 : .2500 :	
Kim, [1986]		. 가		
Lawrence & Shay [1986]		. 가	: : :	
Berger, Hanweck & Humphrey [1987]		. . 가	: : :	( - )
Lawrence [1989]	Box-Cox	. 가		
Mester [1990]	Translog	< > . , . 가 < > . 가		. . .
Berger, Hancock & Humphrey [1993]	2 (quadratic function)	. 가		. 店 藩 限 州 : . 州 間 容 州 : . 單 位 銀 行 州 :
高橋壽台 [1986]	Translog	. 가	. : 都 市 銀 行 : 非 經 濟	

Allen N. Berger

(profit function) ,  
가 . 1980 90 ,  
X (X  
inefficiencies)

가 .

Mester(1990)

. ,

.

**3**

**1**

1999

34.5%가 가 2,227

가 . ,

1997

(<

3- 1> ).

< 3- 1>

( : , %)

	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
	350,511	468,422	616,791	1,066,883	1,494,176	1,655,242	2,227,012
	(31.2)	(28.0)	(24.6)	(25.7)	(27.5)	(29.6)	(40.5)
	13,213	20,123	23,072	104,422	281,353	189,361	161,760
	24,172	89,607	138,836	218,906	211,760	147,312	110,774
	213,218	362,089	768,066	1,386,189	1,627,625	1,436,625	1,163,461
	101,208	135,701	139,342	137,578	146,616	282,492	267,595
	14,072	12,750	19,091	16,337	26,617	79,769	73,511
	118,896	158,320	228,132	316,600	460,740	608,224	373,883
	(10.6)	(9.4)	(9.1)	(7.6)	(8.5)	(10.9)	(6.8)
	71,870	121,532	149,878	288,615	430,270	259,803	268,631
	27,401	56,244	71,890	97,496	122,013	37,190	20,944
	78,149	107,431	175,534	382,896	629,423	822,857	530,245
	112,310	142,047	172,085	222,879	276,288	271,083	305,638

: ( )

: , ₩ , 2000.

< 3-2>

1999

가

35.6% 36%

1997 250,029





.  
1990

5

1999

- 3.46%    - 137.04%

(< 3-3>    < 3-4>

).

< 3-3>    10

( : %)

(ROE)	- 11.53	25.78	- 12.66	11.70	29.40	17.24
(ROA)	- 0.33	1.70	- 0.46	0.45	1.26	0.79

: The Banker, *The Top 1000 World Banks*, July 1998.

< 3-4>

( : % )

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
ROA	5	0.38	0.22	0.05	- 1.95	- 5.89	- 3.46
		0.40	0.28	0.23	- 0.90	- 2.99	- 1.42
		0.42	0.32	0.26	- 0.93	- 3.25	- 1.31
		0.53	0.56	0.47	- 1.17	- 5.83	- 0.11
ROE	5	5.92	3.14	0.74	- 33.05	- 97.23	- 137.04
		6.17	3.91	3.49	- 14.09	- 48.63	- 24.73
		6.09	4.19	3.80	- 14.18	- 52.53	- 23.13
		5.73	5.63	5.41	- 14.77	- 87.40	- 2.28

:  
 : 1999 ( + )  
 : , 『 』 , 2000.

가

1996 0.8% 가 1999 8.3%

(< 3-5> ).

< 3-5> ( )

( : , %)

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999 <sup>1)</sup>
		1,947,392	2,418,270	2,896,448	3,758,317	2,885,048	3,282,945
		18,526	22,944	24,439	100,900	100,192	273,938
	( )	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(2.7)	(3.5)	(8.3)
		1,695,856	2,109,870	2,524,736	3,342,255	2,639,404	3,055,249
		16,318	19,998	21,056	76,700	86,739	247,692
	( )	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(2.3)	(3.3)	(8.4)
		251,536	308,400	371,752	416,062	245,644	227,696
		3,208	2,946	3,383	24,200	13,453	16,246
	( )	(0.9)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(5.8)	(5.5)	(7.1)

: 1) 1999

(3

).

: , ₩ 2,000.

2.

. , ,  
가

가

가 4

1 7,300

1

(< 3-6> < 3-7>

).

1

3 30

1

< 3-6>

4

(1997 )

( : 1,000 U.S. )

	1	1	1
	3,734.8 (1.1)	231.0 (1.5)	67.7
	28,556.0 (8.5)	915.3 (5.8)	-206.1
	9,272.2 (2.8)	289.7 (1.8)	34.5
	6,237.5 (1.9)	235.1 (1.5)	26.9
	5,068.5 (1.5)	240.4 (1.5)	53.8
	7,276.4 (2.2)	302.5 (1.9)	50.8
	3,354.9 (1.0)	156.6 (1.0)	-7.3

: ( )

: The Banker, *The Top 1000 World Banks*, July 1998.

< 3-7>

( : )

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
1	2,053	2,628	3,062	3,701	4,288	5,391	5,949	7,548	9,224	13,015
1	1,473	1,963	2,319	2,802	3,163	949	1,017	511	1,188	1,398
1	1,054	1,250	1,414	1,635	1,955	2,142	2,181	2,346	2,734	3,524
1	31.7	52.1	39.1	40.2	26.8	120	138	146	231	819
1	10.5	11.8	7.9	7.4	-3.51	62	78	88	142	506
1	16.2	18.7	22.5	24.9	26.2	41 <sup>1)</sup>	42 <sup>1)</sup>	37	43	49
1	13.8	16.7	19.5	23.9	25.7	23	33	36	41	54

: 1)

: , 『 』, 1998.

## 2

### 1.

1997 BIS 6% , , , , ,  
 6 6 8%  
 , , , , , 6  
 . 가 가 , , , ,  
 , 5 P&A ( , , , , ,  
 ) , 1999 2

1999 (5  
 ) 9.19% 1997 7.25%  
 1998  
 1 , 1  
 1999 7 3,000 1997  
 36% , 가  
 1 1997 가 (<  
 3-8> ).

< 3-8>

( : , )

	96	97	98	99
	103,913	114,619	75,604	73,173
	4,154,378	5,425,528	5,600,597	5,503,453
	3,352,306	4,262,367	3,904,500	4,033,959
1	40	47	74	75
1	32	37	52	55

: , 『 』 , 2000.

2.

BIS

1998

BIS

BIS

10%

5

1998

12 1,000

1 5,000

5

7

BIS

3,000

BIS

10%

3

3,000

(< 3-9> ).



< 3-9>

	( )			BIS
.	1.5	-	1.5	
5	1.2	5.8	7.0	11 13% <sup>1)</sup>
( )				11.58
( )				11.88
( )	(1.2)	(5.8)	(7.0)	11.07
( )				13.30
( )				11.78
	3.6		3.6	10% <sup>2)</sup>
	(3.3)	-	(3.3)	10.0
	(0.3)	-	(0.3)	10.0
	6.3	5.8	12.1	13.3
4	-	1.2	1.2	-
.	-	7.8	7.8	-
.	-	9.0	9.0	-
.	6.3	14.7	21.0	-

1) 1998. 6

BIS

2) 1998

BIS ( )  
, 1998. 9. 29.

410

1

1998 9

33

48.5%

16 가

377

20

가 , 30

19.9%

75

44)(< 3- 10> ).

< 3- 10>

(1998 9 )

	(A)					(B/A)
		가		<sup>1)</sup>	(B)	
	33	-	5	11	16	48.5%
<sup>2)</sup>	377	20	30	25	75	19.9%
	410	20	35	36	91	22.2%

: 1) . . 가

2) , , , , , .  
: , 『 , 1998. 9. 28.

---

44) (2000), pp. 86 87.

4


1

Berger, Hanweck Humphrey (1987)

가 (expansion path  
subadditivity)

4-1

가



4-1

(B),

(A)

가

( $Q_1, Q_2$ )

A B 가  
 (Q<sub>1</sub>, Q<sub>2</sub>) , E F  
 가 . D A B  
 (Q<sub>B</sub> - Q<sub>A</sub>) 가  
 . 가 B  
 B  
 A D . D B  
 A  
 가 . 가

$$EPSUB(Q_B) = \frac{C(Q_A) + C(Q_D) - C(Q_B)}{C(Q_B)} \dots\dots\dots (4-1)$$

EPSUB(Q<sub>B</sub>) A 가 D B  
 B  
 . EPSUB(Q<sub>B</sub>) < 0 , B 가 ,  
 A D .  
 EPSUB(Q<sub>B</sub>) > 0 B  
 가 .  
 가  
 가 .  
 가 .

가

가 i 가 j 가  
 가 i j  
 (4-2)

$$\frac{^2C}{Q_i Q_j} = \frac{C}{Q_i Q_j} \left( \frac{^2\ln C}{\ln Q_i \ln Q_j} + \frac{\ln C}{\ln Q_i} \cdot \frac{\ln C}{\ln Q_j} \right) \dots (4-2)$$

(4-2)

$$\frac{^2C}{Q_i Q_j} < 0, \quad i \neq j ; \quad i, j = 1, \dots, n \dots \dots \dots (4-3)$$

$$i \neq j \dots (4-3)$$

$$(4-2) \quad (\cdot) \quad 0 \quad (\cdot) \quad \left( \frac{^2\ln C}{\ln Q_i \ln Q_j} \right)$$

가  $(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$   $m$  ,  
 가  $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$  .  
 $y_i \geq 0, x_i \geq 0$  . 가  
 가

$$y_i = g(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \quad \text{가}$$

,  $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$   $(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$  .

$$T(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m, -x_1, -x_2, \dots, -x_n) \geq 0 \dots \dots \dots (4-4)$$

$$y_i (i = 1, 2, \dots, m) \geq 0 ,$$

$$y_{m+j} = -x_j (j = 1, 2, \dots, n ; x_j \geq 0) ,$$

(4-4) (4-5) .

$$T(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m, y_{m+1}, y_{m+2}, \dots, y_{m+n}) \geq 0 \dots \dots \dots (4-5)$$

$$y_i (i = 1, 2, \dots, m+n) \geq 0 \quad \text{(net outputs)}$$

, 가 가 .

$T(\cdot)$

가 .

$$T(y_i) = T_i, \quad T(y_i, y_j) = T_{ij}$$

$(i, j = 1, 2, \dots, m+n)$

가 .  $T_i$

가 .

(Convex) .

가

가

$$\text{Max} = \sum_{i=1}^{m+n} p_i y_i$$

$$\text{S.T. } T(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m+n}) = 0$$

$y_i, p_i$  가 .

(Lagrangian function) ,

$$L(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m+n} : \lambda) = \sum_{i=1}^{m+n} p_i y_i + \lambda T(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m+n})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m+n} p_i y_i + \lambda T(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m+n}) \dots (4-6)$$

$$T(\cdot) = 0$$

(Kuhn-Tucker)

$\{y_i^*\}$

(saddle point) (4-7) ,

(4-8) .

$$L(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m+n}, \lambda) = L(y_1^*, y_2^*, \dots, y_{m+n}^*, \lambda^*) \dots \dots (4-7)$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial y_i} \leq 0 \quad (i = 1, 2, \dots, m)$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial y_i} \geq 0 \quad (i = m + 1, \dots, m + n) \dots \dots \dots (4-8)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m+n} \frac{\partial L}{\partial y_i} \cdot y_i^* = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} \leq 0, \quad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} \cdot \lambda^* = 0$$

$$y_1^*, y_2^*, \dots, y_{m+n}^* \quad L$$

1

$$p_i + \lambda^* T_i = 0 \quad (i = 1, 2, \dots, m) \dots \dots \dots (4-9)$$

$$p_i + \lambda^* T_i = 0 \quad (i = m + 1, m + 2, \dots, m + n) \dots \dots \dots (4-10)$$

$$(4-9) \quad (4-10) \quad m + n \quad 1$$

가

$$\frac{p_i}{p_j} = \frac{T_j / y_j}{T_i / y_i} = \frac{y_j}{y_i} \quad (i, j = 1, 2, \dots, m + n) \dots \dots \dots (4-11)$$



가  $y_1^*, y_2^*, \dots, y_{m+n}^*$  (4-9) (4-11)  $y_1^*, y_2^*, \dots, y_{m+n}^*$  가  $p_i (i = 1, 2, \dots, m + n)$

$$y_i^* = s_i(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{m+n}) \quad (i = 1, 2, \dots, m + n) \quad (4-12)$$

$\sum_{i=1}^{m+n} s_i(\cdot) = 1$  가  $y_i^*$

가 (Cobb-Douglas), CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution), (Leontief), (Transcendental Logarithmic) (45) 가 (homogeneity), (homotheticity), (separability), (jointness), 가

---

45) Chung (1994), pp.91 - 184 .

가  
가  
가  
가 (translog function)가  
(Shephard's duality theory)  
(Shephard's lemma) ( )  
(Allen-Uzawa  
partial elasticities of substitution) 가  
(regularity condition) .46)

**2**

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46) *Ibid.* pp.139 140.



$$\begin{aligned}
, C &= ( \quad + \quad + \quad + \quad + \quad + \quad ) \\
y_1 &= ( \quad ) \\
y_2 &= ( \quad ) \\
y_3 &= ( \quad ) \\
y_4 &= \text{가} ( \quad ) \\
y_5 &= ( \quad ) \\
y_6 &= \\
y_7 &= \text{가} ( \quad + \quad ) \\
y_8 &= \\
p_1 &= \text{가} ( \quad / \quad ) \\
p_2 &= \text{가} ( [ \quad + \quad ] \quad ) \\
p_3 &= ( [ \quad + \quad + \quad + \quad ] \\
&\quad [ \quad + \quad + \quad ] ) \\
X_1 &= \\
X_2 &= \\
X_3 &= 1 \\
X_4 &= 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$(4-13) \quad ( \quad_{ik} = \quad_{ki}, \quad_{jk} = \quad_{kj} ) \quad \text{가}$$

$$1 \quad ( \sum_{j=1} \quad, \sum \quad_{jk} = 0, \sum \quad_{ij} = 0 )$$

Shepard's lemma<sup>49)</sup>

---

49) 가 1 (4-14)

(4-13) ( lnC/ lnpi)

(singularity)



5  
,  
1998 P&A 24 15  
1999 , 5  
63.5 , 7.7  
, 5  
가 가 40  
47.9 , 22.4 , 5.4  
( < 4-1 > ).

< 4-1 (1999 )

		( )				
	5	5	63.5	48.0	83.1	, , , ,
		6	7.7	0.8	13.3	, , , , ,
		6	47.9	46.1	83.1	, , , , ,
		5	22.4	11.7	31.3	, , , ,
		4	5.4	8	8.5	, , ,

: , 『 』 , 2000.

2.

가 , ( 1 )<sup>51)</sup> .

가 .

가 OLS

(multicollinearity) 가

가 .

가

가 , 가

,

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51)

가

(bundle)

가

가

,

.

( $X_i$ )

( $x_{11}, x_{12}, \dots, x_{1n}$ )

가

,

( $X_2$

$x_{21}, x_{22}, \dots, x_{2n}$ )

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가

가

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가

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( 1 ).

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( )

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가

가

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가

(commercial banking)

가

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가 , , 가  
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 ,  
 , (matching) 가 (bias)가  
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### 3. 가

가 , ,  
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 가 ( ) 가  
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가 ( )

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가 ( )

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가 , 가

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, 가 ( ) 5 가

가 .

, 가 ( ) 5

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< 4-2>

( : , %)

					가			가		가	가	
A	1995	49,993	75,882	50,573	18,020	1,528	33,072	105,513	2,306	22.2838	26.4263	11.7524

: A Z A .

# 4

1.

< 4-3> .

, 가 .

$R^2 = 0.9158$  , 가

가 1

,  $(y_1, y_2)$   $(x_1, x_2)$

가 正

가 가 가 . D.W가

1.49 serial correlation 52),

SSE(Sum of Squares Error) 0.1442 가 .

( 1)  $Y_1 \dots Y_8$   $P_1 \dots P_3$  가

4-3 4-3

$$52) \quad D.W = \frac{\sum_{t=2}^T (\hat{e}_t - \hat{e}_{t-1})^2}{\sum_{t=1}^T \hat{e}_t^2} \cong 2(1 - \hat{\rho}), \text{ where } \hat{\rho} = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \hat{e}_{t-1} \hat{e}_t}{\sum_{t=1}^T \hat{e}_t^2}$$

- $\hat{\rho} = 0$     No serial correlation    D.W = 2
- $\hat{\rho} > 0$     (+) serial correlation    D.W < 2
- $\hat{\rho} < 0$     (-) serial correlation    D.W > 2

< 4-3

	ln C( )	<sub>1</sub> ( )	<sub>2</sub> ( )
	-8.9222(-0.77)	6.2330( 9.03)	3.1803( 4.83)
ln y <sub>1</sub>	-3.3162(-2.95)	-0.0625(-2.99)	0.0366( 1.84)
ln y <sub>2</sub>	1.3543( 0.76)	0.0514( 1.09)	-0.0025(-0.05)
ln y <sub>3</sub>	-6.0355(-3.26)	0.1314( 3.37)	0.1141( 3.12)
ln y <sub>4</sub>	-1.6215(-1.27)	0.1380( 3.56)	0.1291( 3.06)
ln y <sub>5</sub>	-1.3755(-1.64)	0.0149( 0.76)	-0.0170(-0.95)
ln y <sub>6</sub>	0.2567( 0.13)	-0.0668(-1.52)	-0.0769(-1.94)
ln y <sub>7</sub>	11.6203( 4.05)	-0.6857(-8.72)	-0.3966(-5.51)
ln y <sub>8</sub>	-0.6323(-0.60)	0.2740( 6.11)	0.0940( 2.24)
ln p <sub>1</sub>	3.0631( 1.37)	0.5123( 2.49)	0.3474( 1.77)
ln p <sub>2</sub>	-4.5791(-5.63)	-0.0367(-1.06)	0.6824( 2.16)
ln p <sub>3</sub>	3.1246( 0.93)	-0.8295(-1.92)	-0.9286(-2.26)
(ln y <sub>1</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	-0.1270(-4.57)		
(ln y <sub>2</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	-0.0316(-0.24)		
(ln y <sub>3</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.6795( 4.24)		
(ln y <sub>4</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	-0.6597(-0.13)		
(ln y <sub>5</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.0151( 0.67)		
(ln y <sub>6</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.0864( 0.72)		
(ln y <sub>7</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	-0.3182(-0.94)		
(ln y <sub>8</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.0990( 1.41)		
(ln p <sub>1</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.5123( 2.49)		
(ln p <sub>2</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	0.6824( 2.16)		
(ln p <sub>3</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	-0.1398(-0.83)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>2</sub>	0.0934( 0.77)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>3</sub>	0.1464( 1.22)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>4</sub>	0.3042( 2.48)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>5</sub>	-0.1725(-2.03)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>6</sub>	-0.2287(-2.41)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>7</sub>	0.4206( 2.32)		
ln y <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>8</sub>	0.0308( 0.53)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>3</sub>	0.1994( 0.78)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>4</sub>	0.3875( 1.48)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>5</sub>	-0.2463(-1.34)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>6</sub>	0.5430( 3.49)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>7</sub>	-0.9960(-3.51)		
ln y <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>8</sub>	-0.0939(-0.82)		

< 4-3 >

	$\ln C( )$	$_1( )$	$_2( )$
$\ln y_3 \ln y_4$	0.2590( 2.98)		
$\ln y_3 \ln y_5$	-0.3946(- 3.78)		
$\ln y_3 \ln y_6$	-0.5214(- 2.92)		
$\ln y_3 \ln y_7$	-0.4980(- 1.94)		
$\ln y_3 \ln y_8$	0.0036( 0.02)		
$\ln y_4 \ln y_5$	0.2630( 2.70)		
$\ln y_4 \ln y_6$	-0.3204(- 3.55)		
$\ln y_4 \ln y_7$	0.4465( 1.92)		
$\ln y_4 \ln y_8$	-0.0545(- 0.44)		
$\ln y_5 \ln y_6$	0.2847( 2.36)		
$\ln y_5 \ln y_7$	0.3986( 2.80)		
$\ln y_5 \ln y_8$	-0.0254(- 0.27)		
$\ln y_6 \ln y_7$	0.1102( 0.31)		
$\ln y_6 \ln y_8$	-0.5130(- 3.84)		
$\ln y_7 \ln y_8$	0.5182( 2.33)		
$\ln p_1 \ln p_2$	0.5954( 1.94)		
$\ln p_1 \ln p_3$	- 1.4333(- 2.10)		
$\ln p_2 \ln p_3$	-0.1349(- 0.91)		
$\ln p_1 \ln y_1$	-0.0625(- 2.99)		
$\ln p_2 \ln y_1$	0.0366( 1.84)		
$\ln p_3 \ln y_1$	-0.2963(- 1.31)		
$\ln p_1 \ln y_2$	0.0514( 1.09)		
$\ln p_2 \ln y_2$	-0.0025(- 0.05)		
$\ln p_3 \ln y_2$	0.3622( 1.24)		
$\ln p_1 \ln y_3$	0.1314( 3.37)		
$\ln p_2 \ln y_3$	0.1141( 3.12)		
$\ln p_3 \ln y_3$	-0.0230(- 0.05)		
$\ln p_1 \ln y_4$	0.1380( 3.56)		
$\ln p_2 \ln y_4$	0.1291( 3.66)		
$\ln p_3 \ln y_4$	-0.0141(- 0.06)		

< 4-3 >

	ln C( )	<sub>1</sub> ( )	<sub>2</sub> ( )
ln p <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>5</sub>	0.0149( 0.76)		
ln p <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>5</sub>	-0.0170(-0.95)		
ln p <sub>3</sub> ln y <sub>5</sub>	0.0336( 0.15)		
ln p <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>6</sub>	-0.0668(- 1.52)		
ln p <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>6</sub>	-0.0769(- 1.94)		
ln p <sub>3</sub> ln y <sub>6</sub>	1.1918( 4.49)		
ln p <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>7</sub>	-0.6857(- 8.72)		
ln p <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>7</sub>	-0.3966(- 5.51)		
ln p <sub>3</sub> ln y <sub>7</sub>	-0.5055(- 1.60)		
ln p <sub>1</sub> ln y <sub>8</sub>	0.2740( 6.11)		
ln p <sub>2</sub> ln y <sub>8</sub>	0.0940( 2.24)		
ln p <sub>3</sub> ln y <sub>8</sub>	-0.4676(- 1.93)		
X <sub>1</sub>	0.0259( 0.26)		
X <sub>2</sub>	0.0304( 1.81)		
X <sub>3</sub>	-0.6622(- 4.33)		
X <sub>4</sub>	-3.6272(- 4.00)		
$\overline{R}^2$	0.9158		
SSE	0.1442		
D.W.	1.49		

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2.

(1992)

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, , 1.51 1 , z

53) 1.23 0 , t 31.78

가 .

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1995 1999

( . 5 ) ( 4 )

가 .

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53) 1 1 . 0,

1

.

가

가

0.53 0

가

가

가

(< 4-4> ).



< 4-4>

		Sca <sup>1)</sup>	z <sup>2)</sup>	t	Sco <sup>3)</sup>	z <sup>4)</sup>	t
		1.51	1.23	31.78**	0.53	1.49	12.93**
	5	1.32	0.80	16.42**	0.31	1.24	6.22**
		1.74	3.96	50.74**	0.79	6.89	37.75**
		1.32	0.80	16.43**	0.26	0.96	5.26**
		1.68	1.96	24.28**	0.65	1.83	9.16**
		1.70	3.46	37.36**	0.78	6.11	27.34**

- 1) (Sca) Sca<1, Sca>1, Sca
- 2) z ( - 1) / , z<0, z>0, z
- 3) (Sco) Sco<0, Sco>0
- 4) z / , z<0, z>0, z
- 5) \*\* 1%, \* 5%
- 6) < 4-1>

3.

105 2 가 15 가 ( 2 ) .

가  
 가  
 가      가      가  
 , X      가  
 가 (local  
 subadditivity)

가      가  
 가      2  
 (a typical bank)  
 가  
 가  
 4-5      3.34%  
 가      가      105      28  
 2.55%      ( 3 ),      77  
 5.48%      가      ( 4 ).

가      ,      46.1  
 2.65%      가  
 ( 5 ),      가      4.86%      ( 6

), 4.19% 가 ( 8 ), 6.53% 가 가 ( 10 ). 가 1.81% 가 ( 7 ). , 15 , 3 2.36% 12 3.90% 가 . 10 2 3.32% 8 6.07% 가 ( 8 ). 6 6.53% 가 . 가 , 가 2.84% 가 , 4.22% 가 가 ( 9 ). 가 , 30 , 8 2.68% 22 4.86% 가 . 가 , 20 6 가 3.33% , 14 7.46% 가 . 가 가

, , 14  
 7.46% 가 6 가  
 3.33%  
 , 15  
 가  
 54) 1  
 가  
 ,  
 55)  
 가

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54) (2000), pp. 251-285.  
 55) (2000), p. 62.

4-5

( :%)

				가	
	3.34	28	-2.55	77	5.48
	2.65	3	-2.36	12	3.90
+	2.84	8	-2.68	22	4.86
+	2.50	9	-1.81	15	5.08
	4.19	2	-3.32	8	6.07
+	4.22	6	-3.33	14	7.46
	6.53	-	-	6	6.53

: 46.1 , 11.7

5

1

24

15

1)

가

가

(1992)

1998

2)



가

가

가

2



가

가

3

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

## 參 考 文 獻

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-」, 『  
』 7
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가  
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』.
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		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7
A	1995	49993	75882	50573	18020	1528	33072	105513
	1996	70633	99241	55966	25512	3882	42144	136218
	1997	91507	129179	55896	30855	3502	46939	161265
	1998	53300	92235	46874	25665	5243	32901	142688
	1999	38444	85355	73651	35578	4166	28570	172780
B	1995	31975	66726	30673	14001	3901	29856	110102
	1996	44546	87393	35331	17061	4145	31800	143583
	1997	65453	113333	39032	18618	6028	34014	171600
	1998	45267	80954	35315	16405	7928	27447	157138
	1999	85397	170926	110242	50951	13849	41788	306963
C	1995	48171	74215	52040	12061	4605	33731	103624
	1996	51590	87750	51683	15311	6056	36924	132611
	1997	63976	91257	43730	18496	7804	33393	133752
	1998	35546	65624	31783	13081	11114	25417	109371
	1999	17311	44504	28544	16688	8260	11718	121230
D	1995	50420	72459	40010	13148	1350	44351	103609
	1996	65450	91048	45339	15145	1661	53725	129695
	1997	99474	131921	47047	17043	2091	61457	155179
	1998	61780	98155	41959	12910	4879	39529	144091
	1999							D+B
E	1995	29123	53866	29676	15330	1386	36611	85888
	1996	32063	61789	28871	16989	1509	43022	110590
	1997	43645	72659	26771	16859	1610	39505	114021
	1998	28028	56718	25365	12864	2356	31176	99652
	1999	17255	33973	26083	12987	878	18570	88255
F	1995	80291	103625	35969	6843	587	26726	101870
	1996	92641	117191	41130	12322	765	31902	133558
	1997	141042	172639	40595	17994	1123	34875	152738
	1998	92788	120870	45862	13881	4583	23688	170672
	1999	66613	102107	53999	26140	4378	12030	191354

				A	B			
	Y8	X1	X2	X3	X4			
A	2306	398	16	0	1	2010	1936	556
	1701	444	18	0	1	2268	2345	709
	2014	485	19	0	1	2426	2688	706
	1285	421	14			1564	2569	466
	4396	477	11			1870	4318	903
B	1986	354	12	0	1	1921	1633	357
	1470	442	14	0	1	2205	2001	471
	1739	513	15	0	1	2398	2302	560
	747	446	13			1661	2376	460
C	4671	699	21			3197	6668	267
	2210	384	18	0	1	2005	1766	405
	1570	403	17	0	1	2044	1941	458
	1603	413	17	0	1	2119	1998	427
	-1423	339	8			1291	1693	165
D	1884	336	4			1276	2883	237
	1809	360	17	0	1	2043	1706	579
	1604	439	18	0	1	2341	2213	610
	2107	478	20	0	1	2498	2530	318
E	1908	421	18			1664		192
	1726	339	11	0	1	2030	1437	310
	1435	355	12	0	1	2109	1642	381
	1519	357	12	0	1	2080	1810	301
	-82	291	4			1331	1825	249
F	1513	291	4			1302	2336	159
	2703	326	37	0	1	1907	1782	332
	2633	382	40	0	1	2249	2322	480
	4120	400	42	0	1	2541	2645	691
	4764	326	36			1725	2605	280
	4500	281	32			1677	3662	293

A	8631	2696	13229	9020	100459	12266	96218
	10225	2644	16178	9259	122165	8217	124000
	13403	3859	23061	9026	145720	18501	145448
	19753	4713	46900	5820	148140	21476	127069
	14287	3103		6960	191714	44584	102245
B	8820	1714	12896	8230	99291	8879	95041
	10819	1981	15735	8204	119524	9241	117228
	13595	3412	19489	8350	136266	19361	132011
	19825	3994	34788	5785	135883	42578	118369
	26447	5902	85787	11134	315536	34628	176231
C	8825	3318	16382	8748	89553	14456	98580
	8983	3471	19314	8341	99274	11003	121197
	10710	4054	22755	7990	103858	26274	121286
	18048	3108	26712	4870	104238	25609	80574
	11019	1746	32693	4815	129064	27562	62085
D	8641	2191	14149	8593	78986	9950	101147
	9406	2919	17511	8707	94061	8259	129571
	11984	4718	28179	8676	110516	18407	150097
	20449	4722		5781	125474		128610
E	6828	1637	87690	8676	59860	8380	92659
	7992	1739	128893	8311	70511	6574	113220
	9660	2149	108613	7524	78511	16088	114222
	14549	2245	373776	4817	84258	13231	77282
	8635	991	787011	4713	100410	6132	51195
F	8979	3745	14958	8464	55539	12054	93044
	10464	4134	19325	8840	68502	9851	121226
	13574	5835	23297	8705	87922	16076	135199
	18774	6726	43420	5910	100997	19803	130412
	14044	5731	51614	5747	143244	17723	110401

		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7
G	1995	2945	5901	65979	43906	27214	22534	82681
	1996	6126	59406	76568	12322	24951	27425	115210
	1997	10984	22467	85380	79388	21428	34193	145939
	1998	31151	105018	105037	82226	22912	30475	235083
	1999	23595	75379	157016	108804	18498	21705	319584
H	1995							
	1996							
	1997	12187	19158	13326	20291	172455	32234	91093
	1998	8808	17231	21124	22317	177920	34284	137298
	1999	8069	18606	29039	60696	190494	31400	169556
I	1995	23810	44652	42670	8839	632	47424	68832
	1996	33278	52640	52696	10656	1862	53408	97941
	1997	51513	81690	51678	13741	2120	52278	125984
	1998	38352	67577	54458	21558	4935	35724	150861
	1999	33118	63394	84847	35193	4867	19883	175582
J	1995	4573	9005	12518	1745	134	15229	23495
	1996	8044	13452	15626	3048	166	16667	36607
	1997	14762	21515	17679	3631	150	19221	50236
	1998	11203	19591	32907	7763	5633	15251	97788
	1999	7850	20887	45135	16625	8418	14089	117069
K	1995	5367	10563	9680	4040	211	14253	28177
	1996	7218	7218	8573	2755	512	20336	35317
	1997	11802	11802	6148	5765	444	19434	40552
	1998							K+I
	1999							
L	1995	1399	2066	12144	960	473	8716	16264
	1996	1539	2554	15176	1362	300	10915	26538
	1997	3171	5272	15920	2201	209	10592	34696
	1998							L+H
	1999							

	Y8	X1	X2	X3	X4			
G	1180	478	8	0	1	3138	2486	594
	1280	499	11	0	1	3396	3092	604
	1578	511	12	0	1	3512	3295	92
	1969	546	8			2918	3476	900
	2810	588	8			2976	6517	654
H	1533	499	8	0	1	2737	2175	375
	2731	545	5					416
I	3609	538	4					290
	1193	185	9	0	1	1099	1339	491
	1207	198	11	0	1	1266	1618	441
	1774	223	12	0	1	1375	1695	422
	2160	247	8			1336	1552	-119
	2794	250	8			1297	2887	176
	353	98	5	0	1	482	521	65
J	368	109	5	0	1	556	619	93
	518	122	6	0	1	588	730	123
	1924	218	5			757	709	107
	1069	216	5			786	1857	189
	267	115	4	0	1	532	550	63
K	267	125	4	0	1	556	589	83
	291	138	4	0	1	630	715	86
L	226	92	1	0	1	376	380	94
	220	105	4	0	1	459	455	106
	352	119	4	0	1	498	519	104



G	11496	1000	10316	14701	154381	14049	71089
	13302	1344	14057	14244	180543	15086	95300
	16059	1957	19755	13515	208985	21615	119443
	26027	4121	46189	11230	274695	41137	164927
	25933	4599	84130	11453	381633	34089	171586
H	17588	804	4595	12195	195210	12074	76437
	22925	3058		8538	235202		114467
	22329	1939		8973	297261		104183
	6056	1839	12594	4586	44834	10900	87260
	7236	2049	16193	4749	55129	10793	111867
I	8672	3234	18777	4730	73115	9591	128392
	16124	3470	23621	4597	109715	15536	124251
	13126	2401	23478	4464	155121	20215	96839
	1855	419	4502	2096	13283	3884	31565
	2073	589	5829	2200	16668	3809	42071
J	3043	1147	7242	2224	23795	4717	50049
	7518	2036	15603	2864	48233	17363	71725
	8012	2479	19836	2973	91789	20043	68115
	2104	200	3006	2192	11810	1073	31644
	2257	257	3979	2220	14744	759	41886
K	3729	294	4471	2156	23161	830	47072
L	1049	365	2868	1748	10814	2981	19190
	1147	501	3939	1851	13562	5467	27730
	1750	665	4802	1871	19040	6905	33070

		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7
M	1995	2270	13146	9643	2873	209	19196	57900
	1996	3433	16309	13130	4865	637	22676	80090
	1997	5408	30474	8592	6053	808	25954	101335
	1998	4740	23957	23744	6894	2109	19019	127073
	1999	8892	46310	52932	31929	2461	33956	189040
N	1995	1497	2283	10793	759	207	7642	15254
	1996	1890	2727	15479	1043	291	9777	20603
	1997	3541	5148	16250	1623	732	9958	24500
	1998							N+G
	1999							
O	1995	5644	16471	5421	2287	215	18623	56217
	1996	7143	15703	8011	2406	686	21065	68965
	1997	11297	18923	16258	4075	1409	19641	82395
	1998	7901	20234	14106	4774	861	12628	87312
	1999							O+M
P	1995							
	1996							
	1997							
	1998							
	1999							
Q	1995	1321	3549	28538	2930	1507	8419	25449
	1996	1771	4606	33231	3984	1469	12279	33310
	1997	2705	21585	10964	5001	1769	13996	37489
	1998	1803	5779	34470	4382	2099	6979	41606
	1999	1150	4657	37305	6361	2119	4472	49035
R	1995	752	5018	23776	1602	1565	8836	24722
	1996	1565	5201	26067	2601	1738	9844	32368
	1997	2931	28091	6319	3657	2030	10110	36873
	1998	2205	7839	21916	3529	1871	6108	43395
	1999	1659	8546	27396	6462	2006	2935	43598

	Y8	X1	X2	X3	X4			
M	195	86	1	0	1	351	462	62
	191	99	3	0	1	422	544	130
	432	110	4	0	1	465	641	113
	695	173	4			556	729	136
	1160	277	4			894	2095	724
N	220	97	0	0	1	394	346	62
	228	103	1	0	1	441	430	61
	283	107	1	0	1	473	543	63
O	263	78	2	0	1	336	417	104
	186	90	2	0	1	397	532	131
	275	99	3	0	1	424	574	62
	331	104	2			326		99
P								
Q	303	184	3	1	0	873	656	199
	343	201	3	1	0	988	872	228
	479	207	3	1	0	1018	884	209
	357	190	0			758	870	-26
	507	189	0			711	1314	104
R	396	156	2	1	0	802	557	114
	403	173	3	1	0	915	722	143
	548	195	4	1	0	991	842	184
	382	188	1			616	922	126
	-10	172	1			610	1121	137

M	2067	280	10971	1456	11577	1595	63815
	2397	401	12103	1613	16380	1582	84098
	4532	551	13797	1732	31766	2044	94426
	9066	898	17221	2071	55030	6311	98551
	13070	1659	28690	3333	146401	10255	140498
N	963	320	2352	1804	9672	3110	16719
	1099	430	3060	1898	12111	5869	21944
	1392	647	3590	1959	15040	8580	25384
O	2067	280	9845	1400	9040	839	68640
	2397	401	11120	1547	12108	981	80428
	4532	551	12532	1581	20907	2166	85799
	9066	898		1218	31534		75976
	13070	1659					
P							
Q	2455	456	5712	3401	33224	8247	21483
	3075	610	7872	3467	36673	9009	30981
	3601	694	9617	3355	42495	10777	34407
	5028	886	26015	2499	46119	10643	30286
	4199	800	23584	2345	64950	12338	23239
R	2192	372	7743	3441	28271	5474	20405
	2684	426	8732	3389	33511	4876	26441
	3541	653	11670	3332	41652	6235	27748
	4937	735	22638	2074	45665	6775	26277
	4510	615	22852	2054	64476	7864	18286

		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7
S	1995	400	2662	9958	2632	1080	1885	12786
	1996	585	3649	11160	2939	978	2331	14747
	1997	961	3891	11140	2990	1335	3060	14614
	1998							S+M
	1999							
T	1995	703	2232	12778	3216	1108	4510	16729
	1996	828	2519	14231	4099	1532	4861	21089
	1997	1328	4347	14644	5012	1442	5708	23511
	1998	697	2844	14167	4490	1744	3057	23473
	1999	410	2535	17722	6247	2238	1237	30517
U	1995	1	154	2288	573	120	1186	3684
	1996	1	101	2740	789	196	1434	5011
	1997	2	197	3479	915	241	1306	5737
	1998	1	244	3258	739	518	624	5298
	1999	1	689	4504	1270	477	368	7359
V	1995	1360	2871	19898	3086	2338	2738	18150
	1996	1840	3603	21559	4527	3257	4440	21557
	1997	2936	4918	24441	4958	4805	5844	23987
	1998							V+J
	1999							
W	1995	258	1469	5574	2207	559	1939	6493
	1996	410	1530	6214	2766	628	1445	9930
	1997	864	2048	7114	2980	793	1416	9666
	1998	344	2708	5555	2331	866	828	11118
	1999	218	2583	7364	3875	936	346	13342
X	1995	564	1199	5952	1166	279	1155	7927
	1996	965	1536	6479	1595	637	1506	12176
	1997	1885	2313	8912	2048	874	1409	13649
	1998	1740	4099	4127	1466	893	920	11659
	1999							X+A

	Y8	X1	X2	X3	X4			
S	238	100	0	1	0	426	289	56
	86	113	0	1	0	472	378	73
	135	120	0	1	0	467	395	77
T	205	131	1	1	0	415	400	103
	161	145	1	1	0	485	509	100
	186	147	1	1	0	517	603	126
	-82	135	0			471	780	50
	-73	132	0			409	796	115
U	55	40	0	1	0	147	113	26
	14	45	0	1	0	179	147	24
	19	46	0	1	0	172	150	24
	-17	40	0			141	129	13
	183	34	0			114	176	12
V	268	148	1	1	0	616	586	176
	287	171	1	1	0	655	678	208
	251	194	1	1	0	735	810	210
W	69	76	0	1	0	265	176	71
	28	81	0	1	0	317	245	81
	64	85	0	1	0	324	261	85
	70	63	0			216	304	-57
	93	67	0			212	407	62
X	94	53	0	1	0	201	175	48
	90	64	0	1	0	237	243	56
	167	70	1	1	0	255	272	53
	683	64	0					34

S	1291	98	2348	1831	13829	1559	7295
	1519	133	3487	1770	15051	2020	9689
	1620	188	5551	1734	15816	2891	9894
T	1561	187	7022	1918	16607	2480	13009
	1934	279	8691	1993	18232	2863	16202
	2114	341	10950	1930	19274	3730	18141
	2942	442	15610	1762	22716	4687	16497
	3078	377	5855	1532	42733	4332	10079
U	253	9	425	749	3211	195	3004
	347	14	495	804	3806	414	3835
	489	44	623	755	4098	752	4290
	816	54	758	622	5464	687	3243
	708	51	586	502	8506	720	3504
V	2105	340	3643	2841	24473	5826	10859
	2297	424	3837	2893	27231	6965	13905
	2517	656	4492	2907	27479	10042	16777
W	960	30	842	1182	8338	633	5873
	1038	49	902	1212	9425	1243	6646
	1133	98	986	1195	9538	1557	7293
	1494	141		798	9479	1055	7015
	1177	77		784	16160	989	6238
X	861	82	683	1017	6157	593	4840
	927	190	951	1090	6583	931	6821
	1094	301	1067	1116	8048	1389	1389
	1746	269		683	8285		

		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7
Y	1995	1914	3883	16761	2501	284	3915	14577
	1996	2668	4700	19367	3203	847	7363	17387
	1997	4495	13578	15077	3845	1193	7230	20264
	1998	3113	6344	19797	3914	1218	2781	21581
	1999	2249	5886	26437	5150	1783	852	27927
Z	1995	469	1163	4871	1183	205	1112	6909
	1996	503	1086	5554	1816	185	1105	9306
	1997	689	3195	3099	2224	218	1019	9608
	1998	434	1961	4497	1609	194	240	8119
	1999							Z+A



	Y8	X1	X2	X3	X4			
Y	209	136	1	1	0	579	430	131
	214	158	2	1	0	674	569	144
	263	168	3	1	0	683	654	153
	118	153	1			455	636	-11
	451	146	0			443	691	28
Z	96	57	0	1	0	222	179	46
	131	63	0	1	0	237	192	43
	168	73	0	1	0	259	212	47
	-184	59	0					15

Y	1713	167	4554	2453	19710	3089	10297
	1942	262	4976	2503	22076	3178	13837
	2121	328	4339	2557	24102	3963	16096
	3491	411	11124	1706	27979	4623	13678
	3107	394	7237	1662	38063	6106	8928
Z	639	112	696	1014	5898	891	5009
	771	178	905	1043	6264	982	6803
	1027	191	802	1048	7814	1479	5777
	1819	181		703	9443		3184

(			가		가	
	T+U	14107	15390.6589	9.099446374		1
	T+W	15562	16869.5353	8.4021032		1
	T+Y	21364	22791.4162	6.681408912		1
	U+W	4007	4291.1804	7.092098827		1
	U+Y	9809	10213.0613	4.119291467		1
	W+Y	11264	11691.9377	3.79916282		1
				6.532251933		
가						
	T+U	14107	15390.6589	9.099446374		1
	T+W	15562	16869.5353	8.4021032		1
	T+Y	21364	22791.4162	6.681408912		1
	U+W	4007	4291.1804	7.092098827		1
	U+Y	9809	10213.0613	4.119291467		1
	W+Y	11264	11691.9377	3.79916282		1